Cedarville University

DigitalCommons@Cedarville
Business Administration Faculty Publications

School of Business Administration

5-2010

Operationalizing Small Space: Challenges of
Moving from Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation to Operations
B. E. Wilson
Jeffrey E. Haymond
Cedarville University, jhaymond@cedarville.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/
business_administration_publications
Part of the Military and Veterans Studies Commons, and the Policy Design, Analysis, and
Evaluation Commons
Recommended Citation
Wilson, B. E. and Haymond, Jeffrey E., "Operationalizing Small Space: Challenges of Moving from Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation to Operations" (2010). Business Administration Faculty Publications. 12.
http://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/business_administration_publications/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@Cedarville, a service of the Centennial Library. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Business Administration Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Cedarville. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@cedarville.edu.

Operationally Responsive Space

Operationalizing Small Space: Challenges of
Moving from Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation to Operations
Col Burke E. “Ed” Wilson, USAF
Commander, 45th Space Wing and Director Eastern Range
Patrick AFB, Florida
Col Jeff Haymond, USAF
Vice Commander, Space Development and Test Wing
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

O

perationally responsive space (ORS) is both an ideal
type and an emerging reality. As an ideal type, ORS
provides a vision of how space can become more relevant at
the tactical level of conflict. ORS is quickly gaining relevance
to all space activities, and the tenets learned in pursuit of specific ORS capabilities hold increasing promise for application
across the space enterprise. As ORS has matured it provides a
glimpse into how space systems could be developed, acquired,
and operated. For example, the first operational ORS system
(ORS-1) is being developed now to support an urgent operational need for US Central Command. If successful, ORS-1
will demonstrate an unprecedented way to field “good enough
to win” space capabilities for the warfighter with aggressive
cost and schedule mandates.
Yet as impressive as the capability may ultimately be, it
is critically dependent upon
a broader set of capabilities
that emerged out of the small
space research, development,
test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
culture at Kirtland AFB, New
Mexico centered around the
Space Development and Test
Wing (SDTW), Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space
Vehicles Directorate, and the
ORS Office. Whether launching Minotaur rockets, conducting satellite command and
control (C2) with the MultiMission Satellite Operations
Center (MMSOC), pushing
state-of-the-art plug and play
technologies, or using scientific and technical best practices,
ORS is leveraging a broad array of Air Force small space
capabilities. Nonetheless, this Figure 1. TacSat-3 launch.
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dependence has implications, which must be recognized and
addressed. Specifically, the RDT&E-derived small space processes are instrumental for ORS success in terms of cost and
schedule. However, they are not currently operationally robust
enough to support both a growing ORS portfolio of missions, as
well as an emergent small space mission area. This paper will
defend that thesis, and offer specific suggestions regarding how
to correct this deficiency.
Some question whether there is a small space mission area,
especially given the lack of requirements in the traditional
sense—no one has tasked the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) to develop small space capabilities per se. Instead,
our legacy RDT&E space enterprise has become increasingly
relevant operationally, which has led to heightened expectations. The ability to package increasingly potent capabilities
into smaller, less complex (and less costly) systems is pushing
small space into a new league. An example from the 1990s
may be a good analogue. During the 1990s, after the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) had been officially acknowledged, we openly discussed the differences between Air Force
Space Command (AFSPC) and NRO as being between “white”
and “black” space. However,
we soon found this distinction
to artificially define seams, and
recognition of a new category
called “gray” space characterized space systems that could
support both “white” and
“black” space requirements.
Space-based radar and the
transformational communications satellite were examples
of this gray space.
A similar parallel seen in
small space today is the distinction between designating
a mission as either “RDT&E”
or “operational.” The designation leads to divergent development, acquisition, test and
operational processes, which
in general leads to less oversight, redundancy, and rigor for
RDT&E systems. The allure is
faster, more cost effective mission design, development, acquisition and ultimately field18

ing to operations. As noted, advances in technology are making
RDT&E systems much more capable—to the extent that combatant commands (COCOM) are increasingly interested in the
capabilities small space can bring to the fight. Consider just a
few of the recent or current small space missions. The Experimental Satellite System-11, known as XSS-11, was launched
in 2005 as an AFRL experiment to gain insight into proximity operations. It was developed using RDT&E processes and
launched and operated using RDT&E boosters and C2 systems.
Yet XSS-11 was vital to the development of the emergent space
control mission area. Do warfighters today care about the lessons learned from XSS-11? We suspect so, but it was only the
first in a trend. TacSat’s 2 and 3 followed, with TacSat-3 providing hyperspectral imagery to COCOMs.
AFSPC is conducting initial planning to support a transition
of TacSat-3 to operations after the one-year experiment concludes. The new Minotaur IV “RDT&E” rocket is preparing
to launch the Space-Based Space Surveillance System (SBSS)
and the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2A missions. And of
course, the first ORS satellite is being developed now. Determining the right balance between rapid, agile processes typically associated with RDT&E system development and the more
rigorous, yet slower (and costly), traditional processes is a key
challenge for responsive space missions.
Clearly, the answer to “how much” operations processes cannot be none; the importance of these missions dictate that we
have the robustness required to meet warfighter needs. ORS-1
was identified as an urgent operational need; the “urgent” designation requires leveraging the right RDT&E processes, while
the “operational need” mandates operational rigor and robustness. The challenge is finding the proper balance across the full
spectrum of functionality—development, acquisition, testing,
logistics, training, mission assurance, operational procedures,
contingency operations, and so forth.
Consider one segment of the small space enterprise; launch
systems, which primarily leverages Minotaur rockets developed in the Rocket Systems Launch Program (RSLP). RSLP
was established to oversee safe storage and handling, aging surveillance, and safety of flight for excess intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) motors and components to support both
test launch requirements and the operational ICBM fleet (as required). Several recent events provide valuable insight. First,
a closer look reveals that since the RSLP assets were declared
excess to operational need in the early 1990s (Minuteman) and
2000s (Peacekeeper), the assets were dropped from official Air
Force supply processes. While this made sense from the perspective that no one would be requesting those assets to replace
depleted inventory, the Air Force lost the ability to positively
control the inventory of RSLP assets associated with the nuclear enterprise—a lesson we have recently relearned across
the larger Air Force. We can and must be able to track critical
assets at all times to include RSLP motors and components.
Second, the handling of these critical launch assets requires the
consistent application of technical orders. General C. Robert
Kehler challenged the SDTW leadership during their inspector general outbrief to strictly follow ops procedures with the
19

admonition, “you can call it a target, you can call it test, but it’s
operations!” Given the necessity to launch safely and successfully, this is wise counsel—no matter what the purpose. Lastly,
the inability to appropriately resource the system development
and mission assurance of the Minotaur IV was assessed by
multiple independent review teams as one of the primary root
causes for recent launch delays, costing the larger space enterprise well in excess of $100 million. In response, senior Air
Force leadership has made robusting the small launch capability one of SMC’s top priorities for 2010.
Robusting the small launch capability means we must be
able to launch Class A payloads if required. We can see the
implications of this in figure 2 below. Using research, development, test, and evaluation heritage launch processes with Minotaur 1, AFSPC has a relatively affordable launch capability
with a high success rate. With the expanded operational importance of key payloads such as ORS-1 and SBSS, we require
a more robust operational launch capability such as point 2 in
figure 2 below. The intent is to hit the “knee in the curve” for
the most operational robustness while keeping costs relatively
affordable. Once ORS systems have demonstrated their worth
and we achieve the ORS future state of having many payloads
available to launch at a quick pace, it may be possible to accept
significantly more risk to achieve stringent cost and schedule
goals, such as the future ORS state at point 3 below.

Figure 2. Small launch capability, launch Class A payloads.

Conversely, as the ORS-1 satellite has experienced cost
growth, both the AFSPC commander and the secretary of the
Air Force have pushed hard on wing leadership to meet cost
and schedule goals. Meetings with key congressional staffers
have only reinforced the need to develop capabilities cheaply,
that are “good enough to win.”
The fundamental question is whether the “good enough to
win for RDT&E” with its rapid, agile strategy can be leveraged
to make the leap to “good enough to win” for the warfighter
with enough operational rigor to ensure mission success. These
messages are in tension, but not in conflict; the importance of
the mission sets in small space requires the underpinning of
operational rigor, but we must be able to rapidly deploy these

										

High Frontier

capabilities in a cost effective manner. While this seemingly is
the impossible task of “having your cake and eating it too,” this
tension presents a unique opportunity to reexamine the way we
acquire and operate space systems. ORS provides the impetus
to evaluate every aspect of our acquisition and operational processes and develop a new “playbook” that exploits the strengths
of operational and RDT&E communities. To overcome the
weaknesses of the past and build operational robustness into
the inherently flexible RDT&E processes, we must:
1. Recognize an ounce of prevention is better than a
pound of cure. While the cost goals of ORS seem unobtainable when built upon an operational foundation,
the opposite is closer to the truth. Wise early spending
to build an operational foundation for ORS will significantly reduce downstream costs. While prescience of
future ORS needs without firm traditional requirements
is not a trait highly rewarded by AFSPC programming
budget drills, it is nevertheless required; and therefore
will likely have to be driven top down. We have clearly
learned from “big space” that lack of resources at the
initial stages of space system development and acquisition costs us in spades when we experience mission or
acquisition failure. In a recent small space example, the
ORS-1 satellite build decision was made in July 2008
with funding contingent on Congressional approval for
the reprogramming of funds. Naturally, when delays
were experienced with the reprogramming, the program
lost momentum and incurred delays. When a program
is intended to deliver a space capability in less than two
years, it is vital that all aspects of the program are “ready
to go” at program initiation.1
2. Identify the processes to apply the “ounce of prevention.” While ORS has blanket waivers from the JCIDS
requirements process, some of its supporting architecture
pieces do not (such as launch and C2). AFSPC needs
to deliberately review all small space processes across
the life cycle to determine where the most bang for the
buck is in terms of robusting the mission area. Some will
require only money but preserve rapid schedule ability
(i.e., preparing the infrastructure that ORS can leverage)
such as improved logistics processes, expanded up-front
launch mission assurance, full acquisition funding at program initiation, and so forth. Other processes may take
money and time, such as full blue suit operations. Alternative operational constructs should also be assessed, especially in the area of satellite operations. With the future
of satellite operations increasingly migrating from telemetry, tracking, and commanding (TT&C)-type operations

to mission planning, perhaps the national and RDT&E
model of contractor TT&C with blue-suit mission planning might be the best approach. If an existing process is
not clearly providing value, it should be jettisoned. For
example, the program executive officer of space waived
the requirement to pursue certified earned value management reporting for ORS-1, as the very timelines we intend to support are faster than the certification process
required of this financial data. Similarly, much program
office and HQ AFSPC time was squandered trying to
ascertain exactly which test processes would apply, and
whether a test and evaluation master plan was required.
The initial default answer across the major command and
center functions seems to be that unless told otherwise,
standard Air Force processes must apply. We must do
a focused review on all AFSPC functional processes to
determine which are absolutely essential to apply to ORS
missions—with the burden of proof on the functional to
demonstrate why their process is necessary.
3. Build an ORS sandbox. Nevertheless, we will undoubtedly find that many of the functions needed for big space
are still required for small space, but they do not necessarily need to be done in the same order. In fact, many
must be done in advance to be able to meet the timelines
required. For instance, we must have the tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) architecture
in place for future versions of ORS-1. We must have frequency approval pre-approved for space downlinks. We
must have satellites that fly on MMSOC. We must build
an ORS box that bounds the requirements in advance to
speed approval; if an ORS mission requirement comes
through which fits in that box, it is ready to go. A key
part of the ORS architecture is defining the standards
that future responsive space systems must comply with;
space common data link and MMSOC are only two parts
of the standard architecture that are coming online now.
We must continue with plug and play satellite buses and
payloads. The tasking system for ORS-1, VMOC, must
be leveraged for tasking other ORS missions beyond infrared imaging.
4. Leverage the broader space enterprise. Interestingly,
the 1990s “gray” space category forced unprecedented
cooperation between two historically separate space development processes (NRO and AFSPC).2 Close collaboration between acquisition and operations is likewise
essential to ensure the up-front integration is successful.
With the ORS-1 satellite, 1st Space Operations Squadron
(1 SOPS) operators work closely with both the Space Test

ORS provides the impetus to evaluate every aspect of our acquisition and operational
processes and develop a new “playbook” that exploits the strengths of operational and
RDT&E communities.
High Frontier
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Squadron RDT&E satellite operators, as well as the Responsive Space Squadron acquisition arm to ensure that
once on orbit, 1 SOPS will be ready. The collaboration
required is not just within AFSPC or even the Air Force;
we must also successfully integrate our programs with a
TPED architecture that includes both Army and Navy capabilities. This means we need to learn how to test across
an integrated, joint system. Our culture must embrace
being part of a broader mission area; too often each organization focuses on what they do as “the mission,” to the
detriment of the broader collaboration needed for small
space and ORS. Further, the resource constrained environment we face necessitates collaboration since no organization will have the resources to bring it all together.
Within the specifics of the acquisition piece, for example,
we are looking at how to transition from the ORS “jump
ball” approach of picking a single agency to execute an
urgent need, to an “all star” team where the Air Force
may execute the majority of the effort, but will supplement with key external partners for a joint team.
Small space capabilities and ORS requirements are blurring
the line between operational and RDT&E satellites. Small space
technologies and budget realities will only accelerate this trend.
ORS-1 is a critical satellite to meet COCOM requirements, but
perhaps its most important function is to highlight the limitations in our current processes. By bringing to the forefront the
functional requirements that drive cost and schedule, we may
carefully consider the cost/benefit tradeoff of current operational and acquisition processes. Further, ORS-1 is reliant upon a
small space architecture that must be robust enough to support
operational missions. The ORS Office ultimately hopes to have
enough capabilities “in the barn” that they can take increased
risk and avoid the increased robustness that this paper argues
is necessary, driving down both cost and schedule. That may
be the case in some end-state, but that is not the state we find
ourselves in today and in the near future. To the extent ORS is
successful in the near term, it will provide capabilities that are
few in number but critically important. In the end, some operational robustness must be relaxed, and some RDT&E processes
must be strengthened. May we have the wisdom to determine
the right balance.
Notes:
1
All aspects must include ops procedures, logistics processes, defined
risk acceptance and associated mission assurance, reporting requirements,
test requirements, etc.
2
Nonetheless, the partnership did not bear fruit with space radar, perhaps because of the lack of full commitment on both sides to a joint program.
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